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Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between regional trade integration and trade costs in ser-
vices industries. The empirical analysis relies, on the one hand, on a dataset of theory-consistent
bilateral trade costs calculated for 61 countries over the period 2000-2011 and, on the other
hand, on an analysis of services commitments in 66 regional trade agreements to which these
countries are parties. Despite the proliferation of services RTAs in the past decade, we do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcantly lower bilateral trade costs among countries having signed such agreements.
Several possible explanations are discussed. First, the gaps in services trade data and the dif-
ﬁculty to account for all modes of supply could inﬂuence our results. Second, the nature of
services trade liberalisation makes it difﬁcult to discriminate between domestic and foreign
service providers (thus not impacting the relative costs they face). Third, there is no clear evi-
dence that countries signing services RTAs do intend to create actual preferences for companies
in partner countries. Services RTAs are about preferential “bindings”. Regionalism in the case
of services seems non-discriminatory and does not lead to trade preferences.
JEL Codes: F13; F15.
Keywords: Trade policy; Trade in services; Regional trade agreements; services trade liberalisation.
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1 Introduction
There are several motives for negotiating regional trade agreements (RTAs)1 and not all of them
are based on economic considerations (WTO, 2011). However, it seems straightforward that when
signing an RTA, countries aim at reducing trade barriers among themselves. Preambles of trade
agreements generally emphasize the promotion of trade and the removal of trade distortions as
objectives that motivate the disciplines of the agreement. We should therefore expect RTAs to
decrease trade costs between their parties, and empirical work in the case of goods tends to sup-
port this idea (see for example Pomfret and Sourdin, 2009; Chauffour and Maur, 2011 and WTO,
2011for a review).
Regional trade agreements covering services have not proliferated as much as those covering goods.
There were 88 agreements notiﬁed to WTO under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) at the end of August 2011, as compared to 213 notiﬁed under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While fewer RTAs deal with services, the share of world trade covered
by these agreements is higher for services than for goods. As will be discussed in the paper, one
should not interpret the fact that two countries have an RTA in services as a sign of “preferential”
trade. In the case of goods, only 16 percent of world trade can be regarded as preferential, i.e.
actually beneﬁtting from a lower tariff in the context of the RTA (WTO, 2011). The same can
be expected from services as GATS-plus commitments are legal bindings that do not guarantee
preferential treatment.
Recently signed RTAs are generally characterized as “deep integration” because they go beyond
traditional market access concerns and deal with a broad range of trade-related issues. They also
deal more with “behind-the-border” policies and address domestic regulations that have an impact
on trade. Services is somehow a “borderline” area. Part of services commitments in RTAs is stricly
speaking about “market access”. But as barriers to trade in services are mainly “behind-the-border”,
1A note on terminology: we refer to “regional trade agreements” rather than “preferential trade agreements” or “free
trade agreements”, as the expression seems to us more neutral. Of course, it could be pointed out that most agreements
are “bilateral” rather than “regional”. But trade agreements in the case of services are not always “preferential” and
never lead to “free trade”. Switching to PTAs or FTAs does not improve the accuracy of the terminology.
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services also illustrate the “deep integration” disciplines in recent RTAs.
Moreover, there is a consensus in the literature on the fact that services RTAs are WTO-plus.
Several studies have compared market access and national treatment commitments in GATS and
commitments in RTAs and unequivocally found that the latter cover a much higher number of sub-
sectors than the former (Marchetti and Roy, 2008; Fink and Molinuevo, 2008; Miroudot et al.,
2010)2. But commitments are legal bindings and do not always correspond to the actual trade
regime, which might be more liberal (or less liberal). The extent to which services RTAs have led
to trade liberalisation and actually reduced trade costs becomes an empirical question.
Building on Miroudot et al. (2012) where we have developed theory-consistent estimates of bilat-
eral trade costs for a large number of countries over the period 1999-2009 (and which we extend to
2011 here), this chapter further analyses the relationship between regional integration and the evo-
lution of trade costs in services industries. The next section explains how we measure trade costs in
services and describes the database of services commitments in RTAs that we use in the analysis.
Section 3 provides stylised facts on trade costs within and outside regional trade agreements and
Section 4 discusses why services RTAs seem to have a limited impact on trade costs in services.
Section 5 concludes.
2Some studies have also uncovered the phenomenon of GATS-minus commitments. See Adlung and Miroudot
(2012).
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2 Empirical data on trade costs and services trade liberalisa-
tion at the regional level
2.1 Bilateral trade costs in services: a database covering 61 countries over
the period 2000-2011
Starting from the standard, theory-consistent gravity model of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
Novy (2011) develops a comprehensive measure of bilateral trade costs.3 Equation 1 presents that
measure in ad valorem equivalent terms as τi jkt , where k indexes sectors and t indexes time. It is the
geometric average of bilateral trade costs for exports from country i to country j and from country j
to country i, expressed relative to domestic trade costs in each country ( ti jtii and
t ji
t j j
respectively). To
calculate it, all that is required is data on domestic production relative to nominal exports in both
countries ( xiixi j and
x j j
x ji
respectively). The parameter σ is the elasticity of substitution among varieties
in a sector, assuming the Anderson and Van Wincoop-based derivation of Novy’s measure of trade
costs.
τi jkt =
(
ti jkt .t jikt
tiikt .t j jkt
) 1
2
−1 =
(
xiikt .x j jkt
xi jkt .x jikt
) 1
2(σ−1) −1 (1)
Intuitively, Novy’s measure captures the fact that if a country’s trade costs vis-à-vis its trading
partners fall, then a part of its production that was previously consumed domestically will instead
be shipped overseas. Trade costs are thus closely related to the extent to which a country trades
with itself rather than other countries, and data on this kind of relative openness can be used to
track the level of trade costs and their variation over time. Importantly, this measure of trade costs
is “top down” rather than “bottom up”. By this we mean that it infers the ratio of inter- to intra-
national trade costs based on observed patterns of production and trade around the world, rather
than building up an estimate of trade costs based on data covering particular types of impediments
3In fact, Novy (2011) shows that basically the same measure can be derived from a wide variety of theoretical
models of international trade, including Chaney (2008) and Eaton and Kortum (2002). The interpretation of some
parameters changes depending on the model used, but the overall approach remains very similar. Novy’s approach
builds on Head and Ries (2001).
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to trade. It thus takes account of all factors that inﬂuence trade costs, and is not subject to the kind
of omitted variables bias that calls into question the results of previous attempts to measure trade
costs in services by analyzing the results of gravity model estimates (e.g., Walsh, 2006).
We use this approach to calculate new trade costs measures for 61 countries and nine broadly de-
ﬁned industries (including four for services) over the period 2000-2011. Our measure of trade
costs captures the costs associated with “pure” cross-border services trade under Modes 1, 2 and
4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). We do not extend the analysis to sales
by foreign afﬁliates (GATS Mode 3) due to lack of data.4 For sectoral output and exports, we rely
on the information provided in the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables that are constructed
for the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database.5 These data are already harmonized
and made comparable across countries. They are sourced from national accounts but reconciled
with trade statistics in a global accounting framework. For data on trade in goods, we rely on the
OECD’s ITCS database which provides data on bilateral trade ﬂows directly in the ISIC Rev.3 for-
mat. Things are more complicated for services where the coverage of ofﬁcial statistics is generally
weak and data are not always available at the bilateral level by industry. We also rely on the work
done by the OECD and the WTO in the context of the TiVA database, using a set of harmonized
data from the OECD’s TISP database (International Trade in Services by Partner Country), Euro-
stat’s balance of payments statistics and the UN’s Service Trade database. This dataset includes
various estimates and all data are converted from the EBOPS classiﬁcation to ISIC Rev. 3 using a
concordance.6 In line with Novy (2011), we assume σ = 8 throughout, but our results are robust
to alternative assumptions.
By way of introduction to the trade costs data, Figure 1 presents average ﬁgures for the period 2000-
2011. The data are disaggregated by sector and trade-weighted tariff equivalents are calculated.
4In Section 4, we report results for sales of foreign afﬁliates based on a small sample of countries for which data are
available. We also indicate how bilateral “Mode 3 trade costs” could be calculated with an approach similar to Novy
(2011).
5We have both gross output and exports at the industry level in this set of I-O tables, the two variables needed to
calculate domestic trade.
6See Spinelli and Miroudot (2015) for detailed information on the creation of these services trade statistics.
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Figure 1: Average trade costs in services sectors, tariff equivalent
Trade costs are very high for the construction industry (keeping in mind that only cross-border
ﬂows corresponding to short-term construction projects are accounted for in BOP statistics) while
a convergence is observed in the case of other services industries with still signiﬁcantly high trade
costs around 100% when expressed as a tariff equivalent. There if a trend towards declining trade
costs between 2000 and 2008 but services trade costs are then raising after the crisis.
2.2 Services commitments in 66 regional trade agreements
To assess the impact of RTAs on trade costs, we use a database developed at the OECD that covers
all services agreements where an OECD economy, China, or India is a party (Miroudot et al.,
2010). This accounts for 66 of the 88 agreements notiﬁed to WTO under GATS Art. V (as of
August 2011).7 The database reports market access and national treatment commitments in the 155
sub-sectors of the GATS Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation List. Horizontal restrictions – those that
apply to all subsectors – are also taken into account and reported on all subsectors. The information
is provided for each signatory of the RTA by mode of supply.
7The full list of RTAs included is given in Annex 1.
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Table 1: Typology of limitations in partial market access and national treatment commitments
Commitments are either “full” (no limitation), “partial” (some limitations listed), or “unbound”
(no commitment). In addition, “partial” commitments are broken down into nine different types of
trade restrictive measures, four for market access and ﬁve for national treatment. This classiﬁcation
of non-conforming measures is detailed in Table 1. The database includes similar analysis for
commitments in GATS and can be used to assess to what extent RTAs are WTO-plus and provide
for additional commitments.
As this database is of a qualitative nature, we compute indices that capture the extent to which
services RTAs are preferential as compared to the GATS. The methodology is the following. An
initial score of 100 is assigned to each agreement, country, subsector, and mode of supply regardless
of its degree of commitment (including the GATS). Then, depending on whether the subsector is
“full”, “unbound”, or subject to some restrictions (“partial”), some points are deducted from this
amount. The precise number of points granted to each restriction relies on a few assumptions:
• Market access matters relatively more than national treatment.
• Unbound is worse than partial, which is in turn worse than full.
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• Quantitative restrictions such as quotas or licensing requirements are more trade-restrictive
than discrimination on subsidies or prohibitions on partnerships for instance.
There is some inherent subjectivity in ranking and weighting the importance of trade restrictive
measures and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss how it can be done. Table 2 sum-
marizes our own subjective assessment and details the scores for each mode of supply (the points
that are lost out of a total of 100 when the sub-sector is unbound or partial). We note that no com-
mitment at all (unbound) does not give a score of zero for a given sub-sector and mode of supply
but 20 (out of 100). “Unbound” means that there is no commitment in the RTA to provide market
access and national treatment, but this should not be understood as trade being banned. It could be
the case that no restrictive measure is actually in place in the country.
Table 2: Scores used to calculate the RTA indexes
Mode
Market access National treatment
Unbound MA1 MA2 MA3 MA4 Full Unbound NT1 NT2 NT3 NT4 NT5 Full
Mode 1 50 15 0 20 0 0 30 15 0 2.5 2.5 2.5 0
Mode 2 50 20 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 5 5 5 0
Mode 3 50 15 20 5 0 0 30 15 0 2.5 2.5 2.5 0
Mode 4 50 15 0 0 20 0 30 0 15 0 0 0 0
Since we work with data on cross-border trade in services, we assign Mode 1 a much larger weight
(70%) than is the case for the other modes (10% for each). Yet, we choose not to give a zero-
weight to Modes 3 and 4 to account for the potential complementarities that may exist between
modes of supply. Mode 2 is also part of cross-border trade but is economically less important
and rather difﬁcult to restrict. We are now left with a score ranging between 0 and 100 for each
agreement/country/subsector. The next step is then to compute for each RTA the difference between
the agreement’s score and the GATS score. This difference therefore takes on values from -100 to
100. Because an agreement that is worse than GATS (i.e., a GATS minus) is de facto ineffective,
we replace all negative values by zeros, which means no preferential treatment at all. Hence, the
higher the value of the index, the more preferential the RTA for a given country/subsector.
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Last, we convert W/120 subsectors into ISIC Rev.3 sectors using the UN’s Provisional Central
Product Classiﬁcation as an intermediate correspondence. Since W/120 subsectors and ISIC Rev.
3 sectors do not match one-to-one, we averaged the RTA index when needed using equal weights.
Eventually, we get an index of the preferential content of RTAs for each party to an agreement that
is compatible with our trade costs data at the sector level.
3 Trade costs and regional trade agreements
3.1 Stylized facts
Our dataset provides bilateral trade costs at the industry level. To compare the average trade costs
within and outside RTAs, we use a trade-weighted average across countries. Trade costs for goods
within RTAs are the average bilateral trade costs in manufacturing industries of countries that are
party to an RTA covering goods. Trade costs for services are measured within RTAs that have
provisions on services (a smaller subset of the RTAs covering goods). In addition, we keep only
pairs of countries for which we have consistent data over time (between 2000 and 2011). Figure
2 highlights the important difference between goods trade and services trade when it comes to the
role of RTAs. On the left, we see that in the case of goods, trade costs are signiﬁcantly lower within
RTAs. The difference tends to narrow over time but trade costs in 2011 are still 22% lower within
RTAs. For services, trade costs are on average higher than for goods. Tariff equivalents, whether
within or outside RTAs, are always between 100 and 125 percent. Moreover, there is no major
difference between trade costs measured within RTAs and between countries that are not part of a
services trade agreement. In 2011, trade costs for services are on average 10 percent lower within
RTAs. Goods RTAs are therefore associated with a difference in trade costs of about twice as much
as services RTAs.
The increase in trade costs over the period (both for goods and services) is partly a composition
effect. The group of countries with an RTA at the end of the period is made up of RTAs with
9
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Figure 2: Trade costs within and outside RTAs: goods versus services
a relatively higher level of trade costs. One could explain this by the fact that countries initially
signed RTAs with their main trading partners that are closer in a geographic sense but also culturally
or institutionally. It is therefore not surprising to see a decrease in the discrepancy between trade
costs within and outside RTAs. But the results for services suggest that services agreements are of
a different nature as compared to goods agreements.
To further assess to what extent Figure 2 reﬂects the composition of the group of countries having
signed an RTA or the evolution of trade costs within these RTAs, Figure 3 gives an average bilateral
trade cost before and after the entry into force of the RTA. We set to t = 0 the year of entry into
force of each agreement and we report the average trade costs (over all the RTAs) up to ﬁve years
before and after this date. As trade costs are to some extent cyclical and vary over time, pulling
different years together introduces some volatility but the results suggest that both in the case of
goods and services, RTAs contribute to a decrease in trade costs. Of course, these descriptive data
do not say anything about causality but they suggest that Figure 2 captures more of a composition
effect.
Lastly, we present in Figure 4 results for the European Union. We have separately calculated
average bilateral trade costs among EU Members and in EU RTAs (i.e. between EU Members
and countries with which the EU has signed an RTA). We have also included in the Figure the
average trade costs for non-EU RTAs (i.e. other RTAs where EU countries are not parties). The
10
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Figure 3: Trade costs before and after the entry into force of the RTA
reason for focusing on the EU is ﬁrst that EU countries have among themselves the deepest level of
integration for services industries. There are more than 500 EC regulations dealing with services
in the EU, and the objective of creating an effective internal market in services has been a priority
since the adoption of the Single Market Act in 1992 (Messerlin, 2012). Moreover, a large share of
observations in our dataset correspond to EU countries and it is interesting to see how including or
excluding EU countries in the analysis impacts results.
The surprise in Figure 4 is that after 2002, we measure higher trade costs among EU countries
than in the RTAs signed by the EU or in other non-EU RTAs, alhtough there is some convergence
towards the end of the sample period. We investigate in more detail in the next section what could
drive these results, but Figure 4 is not at odds with the gravity literature that ﬁnds that an EU
dummy variable generally has a negative sign (indicating that EU countries trade a lower volume
of services than predicted by the gravity model). Whether or not one believes the data, there is the
question of why services RTAs are not clearly associated with lower levels of trade costs.
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Figure 4: Trade costs within and outside RTAs: the case of the European Union
4 Why are services trade costs not lower within regional trade
agreements?
4.1 Can we trust the data?
Anybody working in the area of services trade knows that cross-border trade statistics at a disag-
gregated level (by partner country and/or by industry) are problematic. To begin with, the coverage
of balance of payments trade data is not comprehensive. While total trade in services is generally
available for most economies, trade by partner country or by industry is missing for a signiﬁcant
number of reporters. In addition, for countries that do provide the disaggregated data, there is still
a large share of unallocated trade (Miroudot and Lanz, 2008; Spinelli and Miroudot, 2015). For
example, in the OECD TISP database, adding all the bilateral by industry data gives a ﬁgure that
represents on average 70% of the total trade reported by countries. Almost one third of trade in
services is not allocated to speciﬁc partners or industries.
In addition to unallocated trade, one can also question what the balance of payments precisely
measures. With the development of the Internet and new technologies, many services transactions
are difﬁcult to account for. Measuring trade in services is more challenging than before and one
should not underestimate the impact of these issues on the results of our study and any measure of
12
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trade costs based on actual trade data. But the quality of the data cannot explain by itself the trend
observed over time as the there is no sign of a systematic bias that would minimize international
trade in services over years only for countries within an RTA (and not for pairs of countries not
belonging to any RTA). Issues related to statistics affect all economies within or outside RTAs. The
only case where we should seriously investigate the role of statistical issues is the EU. Because of
the European integration process, there is less information available on intra-EU trade, as opposed
to extra-EU trade.
More important, it seems to us, is the question of whether covering only cross-border trade in
services has an impact on our assessment of regionalism. Cross-border trade in services includes
Mode 1 and to some extent Mode 2 and Mode 4 trade in services. But with some rare exceptions8,
Mode 3 trade in services is not part of the cross-border trade statistics. To the extent that RTAs
encourage Mode 3 over cross-border trade (in particular when they include an investment chapter
that also liberalizes FDI), a substitution between cross-border trade and sales through commercial
presence could explain why we do not see a signiﬁcant impact of RTAs on cross-border trade costs.
Unfortunately, data on sales of foreign afﬁliates (Foreign Afﬁliates Trade Statistics) are even less
available than cross-border trade in services data. We can however apply a methodology similar to
the one we apply to cross-border trade to measure the bilateral “investment costs” or more exactly
the cost of selling through a foreign afﬁliate, the foreign afﬁliate sales (FAS) cost. Building on
Head and Ries (2008), Gormsen (2011) has developed a measure of the cost of barriers to FDI.
We can apply a similar methodology to sales of foreign afﬁliates, as the formula is at the end a
derivation of the gravity equation and the gravity equation applies to FAS as well (see Bergstrand
and Egger, 2007 and Kleinert and Toubal, 2010).
We calculate the bilateral FAS cost as9: τi j =
√
Salesi j.Sales ji
SalesiiSales j j
8For example, in the case of construction services, balance of payments data cover to some extent short-term
contracts where there is commercial presence in the sense of GATS but no establishment (the foreign company operates
in the territory of the partner country on the basis of a local ofﬁce and remains a non-resident entity whose revenues are
regarded as an international transaction recorded in the balance of payments). Construction services data sometimes
include the cost of construction materials which are goods, another issue to measure accurately the services trade
involved.
9We do not discuss extensively the methodology as this is not the purpose of this paper to measure FAS costs.
13
Regional Trade Agreements and Trade Costs in Services
Figure 5: Foreign afﬁliate sales costs intra- and extra-EU (2001-2006)
where sales from i in j and j in i are bilateral FAS, while the sales of i in i (and j in j) are the domestic
sales (calculated as the national turnover minus the sales of foreign afﬁliates). Due to constraints
on the availability of such data, we calculate these bilateral FAS costs for 54 countries over the
period 2001-2006. Figure 5 below presents the average FAS cost intra and extra-EU. Since there
are very few non EU countries in the dataset, one should not over-interpret the results and generally
speaking FAS statistics are quite fragmentary. But the point is that for EU countries for which we
have relatively better FAS data, there is no indication that FAS costs have diminished within the
EU in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s. However, FAS costs are found to be lower within the EU and the
discrepancy between intra- and extra-EU FAS costs increases over time. This increase is likely to
reﬂect the availability of more data over time as because of the gaps in the data there are more and
more non-EU pairs after 2004.
We can thus nuance the picture regarding the impact of RTAs. In the case of the EU, there seems
to be an impact on the cost of providing services through Mode 3. But we have insufﬁcient data
Deriving the equation from a theory-consistent FAS gravity model, there should be a parameter similar to σ in the
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model or γ in the Chaney (2008) model. We take here a very simple approach to
compare FAS costs over time in the context of EU integration.
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to check whether this is speciﬁc to the EU and the deep integration achieved through the Single
Market or whether a similar trend would be observed in all RTAs that cover Mode 3 or have a
substantive investment chapter.
4.2 Services reforms: do they beneﬁt domestic and foreign producers in a
similar way?
In our analysis, we deﬁne trade costs as the additional costs faced by foreign suppliers as opposed to
domestic producers. Equation 1 relates “domestic trade costs” to international trade costs. Because
the measure is relative, a reform that would have the same (or a proportional) impact on domestic
and foreign suppliers would not affect trade costs estimates. Another way of interpreting Figure 2
would then be that any services trade liberalisation (resulting or not from the signature of a RTA)
lowers trade costs for all suppliers so that the ratio between foreign and domestic costs is not
altered.
This would be the case ﬁrst if RTAs had no impact on the actual trade regime. Schedules of
commitments in services are legal bindings. Countries take market access and national treatment
commitments but often these commitments just reﬂect the current state of regulations. Already at
the multilateral level, the literature points out that countries have locked-in their current regime
and not used GATS to liberalize trade (Hoekman, 1996; Adlung and Roy, 2005). It is even less
likely that they would use RTAs to open up new services sectors. Reforming the telecoms sector or
changing regulations for maritime transport will generally not be the outcome of a bilateral trade
agreement. The political economy of services trade negotiations, involving a trade ministry which
is generally not in a position to commit to reform key product markets, could explain why RTAs
are about legal bindings and not actual trade reforms (VanGrasstek, 2010). Such bindings could
nonetheless have a positive impact on trade by reducing the uncertainty around the trade regime
and by bounding the level of restrictiveness the partner country could introduce in the future.
Then, another assumption is that when they do change the trade regime, RTAs have no impact
15
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on measures that discriminate against foreign suppliers. The concept of preferences is not easy
to tackle in the context of services trade (Sauvé and Mattoo, 2011; Sauvé and Shingal, 2011).
Some measures are not really prone to discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers.
For example, market regulations introducing rules on prices, access to networks or increasing the
powers of a competition authority will equally beneﬁt domestic and foreign services suppliers. It
is not possible to create a market more competitive for domestic suppliers only or foreign suppliers
would have to be totally excluded from this market. Then, there are measures such as licenses
or taxes where it would be technically feasible to introduce discrimination between domestic and
foreign producers but where in practice this is not the case. In the end, discriminatory measures
are limited to foreign equity restrictions, labour market tests for the entry of natural persons, and
the recognition of qualiﬁcations. But even in these areas, not all countries introduce discriminatory
measures.
The trend in services reforms is also to increase competition, including by allowing foreign pro-
ducers to enter the domestic market and compete. Countries that have reformed their telecoms
or energy sectors, for example, have generally encouraged the entry of foreign ﬁrms to increase
productivity and lower prices for consumers. In the presence of an incumbent ﬁrm previously
beneﬁting from a domestic monopoly, foreign competition is important for the market to become
competitive. Services reforms are generally not of a discriminatory nature and this gives less op-
portunities for negotiatiors of RTAs to offer genuine preferences to partner countries.
4.3 Is services trade liberalisation de facto MFN?
For the same reasons stated above, there is no clear evidence that discrimination among foreign
producers is the objective or outcome of services RTAs. Unlike tariffs in the case of goods, there is
no easy way to grant preferences for services providers of speciﬁc countries. Market access barriers
or barriers to competition generally apply the same way to all foreign suppliers. In the case of the
recognition of qualiﬁcations or visa policies, some advantage may be given to a priviledged partner
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country. For example, a mutual recognition agreement can be signed or a quota can be granted to
temporary services providers of a given nationality. But in practice, there are very few instances
where countries do discriminate.
Once again, one should keep in mind that services are generally regulated in domestic laws that are
designed for domestic purposes by the ministries in charge of speciﬁc services sectors. Such laws
are not used for commercial diplomacy and do not include legal instruments giving opportunities
to trade negotiators to grant actual preferences to speciﬁc countries. This is why services RTAs are
most of the time about “preferential bindings” rather than actual preferences.
Another reason is that rules of origin for services are quite liberal in the case of legal persons (Fink
and Nikomborirak, 2007; Miroudot et al., 2010). GATS Article V:6 requires that foreign services
suppliers established in a country and engaged in “susbtantive business operations” beneﬁt from
the treatment granted in RTAs signed by that country. For example, EU companies established in
the US can beneﬁt from NAFTA provisions and have the same treatment as US companies export-
ing services to Mexico or Canada. The “substantive business operations” criterion is generally not
subject to speciﬁc tests or requirements.10 This could explain why countries are not willing to intro-
duce discriminatory barriers to cross-border trade in services. Such barriers could be circumvented
by the establishment of companies in countries that would have the most preferential treatment.
This being said, we observe in our dataset differences in trade costs according to the partner coun-
try. Figure 6 highlights differences based on the architecture of RTAs and the way of scheduling
commitments. Trade costs tend to be lower between countries having signed a NAFTA-inspired
RTA11 where there is a negative list of commitments and where services and investment (including
investment in services) are dealt with in two separate chapters. GATS-inspired RTAs that follow
the GATS approach for scheduling commitments (a positive list of sub-sectors where market access
and national treatment commitments are made by mode of supply, followed by a list of limitations)
have on average higher trade costs, even higher than for pairs of countries with no RTA.
10An exception is found in the agreements signed by China with Hong Kong and Macao (see Emch, 2006)
11See Houde et al. (2007) for a more detailed discussion of NAFTA-inspired versus GATS-inspired regional trade
agreements.
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However, Figure 6 should not be interpreted as a causal relationship between the way of scheduling
commitments and the level of trade costs. The results are essentially based on the composition of
each group of countries whose trade costs are being measured. Trade costs are the lowest (at the end
of the 2000-2011 period) in the group of “other RTAs” that includes economic integration agree-
ments, such as the EC Treaty, the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the agreement of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), or the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Part-
nership Trade Agreement (ANZCEPTA). By deﬁnition, countries parties to these agreements are
geographically and culturally closer, hence their lower bilateral trade costs. NAFTA-inspired agree-
ments were originally signed between close countries (initially Canada, Mexico, and the United
States) and over the period trade costs are found to be higher when the NAFTA template is used
by other countries. GATS-inspired agreements include many North-South and South-South RTAs
signed between countries geographically and/or culturally more distant and where services trade is
less developed.
Figure 6: Trade costs by type of scheduling (2000-2011)
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5 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the question of whether services RTAs have an impact on bilateral
trade costs. In the case of services, there is no clear evidence that trade costs are much lower
within RTAs than outside. This is not a surprising result when one looks more closely at how
services trade liberalisation takes place and what the role of services chapters in RTAs is. Services
agreements are about preferential bindings and generally do not introduce actual discrimination
that would favour services suppliers from the parties to the agreement. As such, services RTAs
are to some extent paradoxical. They signal a preference for speciﬁc partner countries but they do
not provide them with preferential treatment, unlike what can be observed with goods. From an
economic perspective, this is all the better as preferences lead to trade distortions.
Do our results mean that RTAs have no economic impact and do not affect trade costs? Further
research on this question is required, including the speciﬁcation of a full econometric model ex-
plaining trade costs in terms of observables, including membership of an RTA. Preliminary ﬁndings
based on graphical analysis and descriptive statistics suggest, however, that RTAs might lower trade
costs, although not to a striking degree, but the costs are decreased not only for the parties to the
agreement but also for non-parties. This could be explained by the liberal rules of origin that extend
the beneﬁts of market access and national treatment commitments beyond parties, or more simply
by the unilateral and de facto MFN nature of services trade liberalisation. Most reforms in services
sectors are driven by domestic concerns and adopted independently of any trade negotiation. RTAs
bind these reforms and their provisions reﬂect the more recent state of the law and new regimes that
are more favourable for foreign suppliers. Our results are consistent with such an interpretation of
services RTAs.
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Annex 1 - List of services agreements covered in the dataset
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